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Abstract 
 
In this paper, we present a generic attack for ciphers, which  
 is in essence a collision attack on the secret keys of ciphers . 
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In cryptography there were more researches formerly on the collision attacks mainly for hash 
functions in preventing falsification, see [1], [2] and [3]. Actually, the collision attacks also exist 
for ciphers. In this paper, we present a generic attack to ciphers, which is essentially a collision 
attack on the secret keys of ciphers. 
 
Suppose that ( , )Crypto key plaintext is a cipher with | |key n= . Let 0x  be a plaintext of 
n bits, then the range of space 0( , )Crypto key x  ( taken as the function of variable key ) will be 
about as large as the one of the key space if function 0( , )Crypto key x behaves as random one. 
Let 0X  be a 3n -bits string of plaintext, we will show later that with very high probability, 
1 0 2 0( , ) ( , )Crypto key X Crypto key X≠ for two distinct keys 1key and 2key .  
Arbitrarily take N  distinct keys ,1 ,ikey i N≤ ≤  and get ciphertexts 0( , ),iCrypto key X  
1 ,i N≤ ≤ to make a dictionary D  with the entrice 0( ( , ), )i iCrypto key X key , 1 i N≤ ≤ , 
arranged in the order of the first component as a number. In the case there are a set of keys, 
1 2
, , ,
si i i
key key key… such that they have same imagine  
1 0
( , )iY Crypto key X′ = = 2 0 0( , ) ( , )si iCrypto key X Crypto key X= =… ,  
then modify the entry as 
1
( , ( ,..., ))
si i
Y key key′ . 
 
Proposition 1 It is assumed that it is equal-probability for the function 0( , )Crypto key X to take 
each ciphertext, denoted by p the probability that the ciphertexts 0( , ),iCrypto key X  
1 ,i N≤ ≤  are different each other, then 
11
2n
p > − . 
 
Proof. Clearly,  
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Suppose an adversary get a ciphertext 0( *, )Crypto key X  for some key *key  to be found, 
and find 0 0( *, ) ( , )iCrypto key X Crypto key X=  for some ,1i i N≤ ≤ , then he will infer that 
* ikey key= with very high successful probability by Proposition 1. Let 2 ,mN = we know it will 
need at most 3nm comparisons to determine/find 0( *, )Crypto key X  in the dictionary D . 
Moreover, suppose that the adversary get 2t  ciphertexts ( ) 0( , )
iCrypto key X , 1 2ti≤ ≤ , 
denoted by pˆ the probability that there is at least one of ciphertexts ( ) 0( , )
iCrypto key X , 
1 2ti≤ ≤ , in the dictionary D . It has that 
 
Proposition 2 If 2t n m≥ − + , then ˆ 0.98p ≥ . 
 
Proof. It is obvious that 
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. 
The conclusion is followed directly from the formula above. 
 
The result above is somewhat similar to the birthday paradox.  
 
In the capability of the modern computers, it seems that the size of the dictionary D  now has 
been able to achieve about 50 bits, so the analysis above suggests that it should use a larger length 
of secret keys for a secure cryptosystem.   
 
The analysis above is a generic one, which may be applied to block ciphers, stream ciphers and 
MAC. Besides, it needs only a few of ciphertexts for one key, e.g. 128,n =  then 0X is a 
48-bytes of string. This makes the attack more feasible. 
 
It maybe should be mentioned that for a good cipher ( , )Crypto key plaintext , the number of 
pre-imagines should not be too much, for otherwise the plaintext would be easy recovered. 
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